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Abstract
The transportation of petroleum represents one of the most strategically important
circulations of resources in the global economy. Its role cannot be overstated. Yet, petroleum
has become a “strategically invisible” commodity as its flow has been continuous with
limited, but eye-opening, disruptions such as the First Energy Crisis is 1973. Petroleum
supplies are virtually taken for granted. Since approximately two-thirds of the world’s
petroleum production is shipped by sea, there are inherent distribution constraints, which
require navigating through straits and passages; chokepoints of maritime circulation. This
paper presents an overview of the geography of oil supply and demand, and the strategic
issues that are linked to its maritime circulation. Chokepoints are perceived as resources,
the value of which varies according to degree of use. As the era of petroleum domination
draws to a close, the importance and vulnerability of strategic passages will increase.
Their ability to handle additional traffic appears to be limited, implying that future energy
crises or oil shortages are more likely to be attributable to the challenges of distribution.
Keywords: Petroleum Distribution, Maritime Transport, Strategic Passages, Hormuz, Suez,
Malacca, Bab el-Mandeb, Bosphorus, Panama
Résumé
Le transport du pétrole représente l’une des plus importantes circulations de ressour-
ces au sein de l’économie mondiale. Son rôle ne peut être exagéré. Cependant, le pétrole
est devenu un produit de base «stratégiquement invisible» puisque sa circulation a tou-
jours été continue, avec des ruptures alarmantes, mais limitées, telles que le premier choc
pétrolier de 1973. L’offre de pétrole est pratiquement prise pour acquis. Puisque les deux
tiers de la production pétrolière mondiale sont acheminés par voie maritime, il existe
d’inévitables contraintes de distribution, parmi lesquelles l’utilisation d’un ensemble li-
mité de détroits et passages: les goulots d’étranglement de la circulation maritime. Cet
article se penche sur la géographie de l’offre et de la demande de pétrole, de même que
sur les problèmes stratégiques liés à sa circulation maritime. Les goulots d’étranglement
sont perçus en tant que ressources dont la valeur varie en fonction de leur niveau d’utili-
sation. Alors que la suprématie du pétrole tire à sa fin, l’importance et la vulnérabilité des
passages stratégiques risquent de s’accroître en conséquence. Leur capacité d’admission
des trafics supplémentaires apparaît limitée, ce qui implique que les futurs chocs (ou rup-
tures) pétroliers seront vraisemblablement liés à la problématique de sa circulation.
Mots clés: Distribution du pétrole, transport maritime, passages stratégiques, Hormuz, Suez,
Malacca, Bab el-Mandeb, Bosphore, Panama
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THE GEOSTRATEGY OF PETROLEUM
The Spice must flow.
Frank Herbert, Spacing Guild. Dune
This simple statement taken from an acclaimed science-fiction chronicle is an
analogy of one of the core foundations of the global economy, to which there is
currently no reasonable palliative or short-term alternative available. As Spice
was to the fantasy future Empire, very few commodities are as vital as petroleum
to the tangible operations of the real world. The flexibility of oil use has made it a
remarkable commodity; it can be used as an energy source or lubricant and raw
material in the manufacturing of plastics and fertilizers. It has even been argued
that petroleum is too valuable a commodity to be used as fuel. As a commodity of
strategic importance, petroleum has been, over the last century, the object of
geopolitical conflicts for access, control and distribution. Although the energy
intensity 1 of the global economy has declined, expanding oil consumption
underlines a growing global dependency. The distribution of petroleum from oil
fields to refineries and then to consumers cannot, under any circumstances, be
interrupted in any significant manner. The fallout would be political and economic
chaos, and a vulnerable and petroleum-dependent global economy could come to
a grinding halt.
 OIL SUPPLY STRATEGIES
To ensure a constant and uninterrupted oil supply, the strategies of industrialized
nations have been articulated by the use of military force (primarily by the United
States), economic incentives and uneasy alliances with oil producers, namely in
the Persian Gulf. Access to this strategic location, especially Saudi Arabia, is likely
to be the most important factor in contemporary energy geopolitics (Klare, 2001).
The growing dependency among developed nations on external sources of oil
reinforces these conventional strategic considerations, when a few key maritime
passages chokepoints of the global economy are considered valuable resources
with a rather fixed supply (Nincic, 2002). Moreover, increased Asian oil demand,
especially within China, has caused a new shift in petroleum circulation and has
stepped up competition over existing known oil resources, including the
chokepoints themselves. The new geography of petroleum circulation is thus
challenging conventional distribution networks, their security and their reliability.
Control of oil supply is becoming increasingly strained with limited alternati-
ves other than to pursue policies and strategies implemented decades ago. For this
reason, the Carter Doctrine, drafted to address the security of the Persian Gulf,
grows more relevant after over 50 years of US military presence in the region.
An attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be
regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and
such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.
(President Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980).
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This doctrine was initially aimed at deterring the Soviet Union after its invasion
of Afghanistan in 1979, but it has been implemented as the result of very different
events and circumstances. With the former Cold War nemesis gone, the hostile
force turned out to be from within the Gulf region itself: Iraq. The Carter Doctrine
has been implemented twice; in 1990 during the First Gulf War and in 2003 for the
Second Gulf War. In the first case it was to quell the intentions of Iraq to gain
control over a large portion of regional oil fields with damaging economic and
political potential. In the second case, a hidden agenda was to ensure future stability
in the Persian Gulf region and hence, its oil supplies. The policy, however, came at
a huge economic and political cost, which can be viewed as a subsidy for stable oil
supplies, paid by the end consumer. The cost of securing access to Middle Eastern
oil, ranging from deployment of forces in the Persian Gulf, the patrol of its water
and the supply of military assistance to nations in the region is estimated to be in
the range of US$50 billion a year (IAGS, 2003). The cost of the First Gulf War was
over US$80 billion, while the final cost of the Second Gulf War has yet to be tallied
and could range anywhere between US$125 billion to US$1 trillion, including costs
for security and to rebuild. Securing oil resources has thus become a complex and
expensive undertaking.
OIL CIRCULATION AND CHOKEPOINTS
The whole issue of oil dependency among nations that lack political stability or
reliability opens the door to occasional disruptions, price changes and a transfer of
wealth. According to the US Department of Energy, the cost of political instability
has been over US$3.4 trillion in the last 30 years, and the transfer of wealth to oil
exporters has accounted for US$1.16 trillion over the same period. The post-
September 11 era is one of realization of the geopolitical consequences this transfer
has had on stability in the Middle East and the acknowledgement that petroleum
must continue to flow regardless. Price fluctuations of the commodity itself have
been substantial and are often linked to periods of growth and recession of the
global economy (Hamilton, 1985). In spite of all the concerns and calls to action,
the ability to substitute for alternative energy sources remains limited (Rifkin, 2002).
Under such circumstances, the global economy will remain dependent and
vulnerable to the circulation of oil, especially over its chokepoints, for at least the
first two decades of the XXIst century.
Chokepoints are a common concept in transport geography, as they refer to
locations that limit the capacity of circulation and cannot be easily bypassed, if at
all. This implies that any alternative to a chokepoint involves a level of detour or
use of an alternative that translates into significant financial costs and delays.
They can also be perceived as a resource whose usefulness varies with the ebb
and flow of the geography of circulation. Considering the characteristics of mari-
time transportation, maritime chokepoints are particularly prevalent. Many of
them are the result of the constraints of physical geography while others, namely
Suez and Panama, are artificial creations. Three core concepts thus define a
chokepoint as a resource:
- Physical characteristics. To begin, a chokepoint is a location that forces traffic
to converge and, by virtue of its physical characteristics, namely depth, width
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or navigability, limits movement. Its physical capacity to accommodate
maritime circulation is thus limited.
- Usage. The value of a chokepoint is proportional to its degree of usage and
the availability of alternatives. The fact that a chokepoint acts as a limit to
circulation imposes a threshold to its use. The closer the traffic is to this
threshold, the more the resource is deemed to be exhausted.
- Access. As a valuable resource, some degree of control must be established
to ensure access to the chokepoint. This requires agreements to regulate use
and settle disputes if access becomes contested. Tolls can also be levied if
the chokepoint falls within a well-defined jurisdiction to control access to
infrastructures such as locks.
Although the physical characteristics of most chokepoints are very stable,
implying a fixed capacity, their use and value can fluctuate significantly. With the
growth of maritime circulation and global trade, many have become extremely
valuable resources, and represent some of the most important strategic locations
in the world. Like all fixed supply resources, however, there is a limit to which
they can be used. The closer they come to exhaustion, the more unstable their use
and the more effort required to secure access.
This paper reviews contemporary evidence related to oil supply, demand and
distribution. Although petroleum-related strategic and economic issues are
understood and have been discussed at length (Yergin, 1991; Venn, 1986), the uni-
que geography of global petroleum distribution, including its maritime chokepoints
certainly merits review. The principal argument is that distribution is as important
as production and pricing issues, since distribution is a fundamental factor to
ensuring that supply meets demand. We begin by discussing the complex
relationship between petroleum and the global economy, particularly in terms of
supply, demand, reserves and distribution. Given the importance of distribution,
we follow with an analysis of the major chokepoints in the maritime circulation of
petroleum. Even as the era of petroleum dominance draws to a close, the significance
of these chokepoints is likely to increase with shrinking supply and growing
demand, particularly from Pacific Asia.
PETROLEUM AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
PETROLEUM PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
The oil industry is oligopolistic in terms of supply, demand, control, function
and geographical concentration (Clo, 2000). Demand is controlled by a few very
large multinational conglomerates, each with its own production and distribution
systems that include refineries, storage facilities, distribution centres and, at the
end of the supply chain, gas stations. Supply is controlled by a few countries where
the oil industry is often nationalized or under a uniform price-fixing policy of
OPEC 2, which controls approximately 37% of world oil production. The geography
of production and consumption is characterized by a strong spatial differentiation
of supply and demand. Due to geographical and geological factors, oil is produced
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primarily far from where it is consumed, resulting in acute disparities, which are
growing rapidly (figure 1). A number of developed nations, including the United
States, have extracted most of their oil reserves and are gradually shifting to foreign
sources 3. This trend can only be overcome by massive oil transportation infras-
tructures, including pipelines, terminals, tankers and storage facilities.
Figure 1  World Oil Balance, 1980-2000
Sources: US Energy Information Agency, International Energy Annual Report
Figure 1 shows the global geography of oil characterized by surpluses and
shortfalls. While the Middle East has the largest surplus (17.3 Mb/d 4 for 2000),
Pacific Asia, North America and Western Europe, all have significant shortfalls
(13.2, 12.9 and 8.5 Mb/d respectively).
Global oil reserves are highly concentrated, with 64% of proven reserves located
in the Middle East. The question remains about the amount of oil reserves that are
economically available and how long they will last. Figures about the planet’s oil
reserves are thought to have been between 2100 and 2800 billion barrels before oil
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development began in the XIXth century. As of 2001, an estimated 1020 billion barrels
of proven oil reserves were available and 900 billion barrels have been extracted,
which represents approximately one-third of all available oil reserves 5. To this
figure, can be added between 200 to 900 billion barrels of oil that potentially remain
to be found (Campbell and Laherrere, 1998). Based on these figures, global oil pro-
duction should peak around 2005-2010 and then begin to decline. In a long-term
perspective, control by OPEC will grow since the bulk of remaining oil reserves is
located within its jurisdiction. Saudi Arabia alone accounts for approximately 25%
of the world’s total oil reserves, putting upward pressure on energy prices.
Oil production steadily increased in the second half of the XXth century to meet
growing demand. On average 68 million barrels of crude oil are produced each day
(2000 figures), 32% of it in the Middle East, the single most important oil-producing
region in the world. Approximately 60% of the total oil currently produced has already
been committed and 40% is sold on open markets. More significantly, the capacity
and geographical origin of surplus oil production is limited and 90% of this surplus
oil production is in the Persian Gulf. In addition to accounting for the world’s largest
oil reserves, Saudi Arabia holds an added advantage as the only major supplier able
to increase production immediately, when needed. Surplus production capacity is
crucial in the event of a major supply disruption since capacity can be immediately
increased to maintain current oil supply levels. Recent events, such as the conflict in
Iraq and civil unrest in Venezuela and Nigeria, have stretched the world’s extra
capacity thin to about one million barrels a day in 2003. Additional sources of oil are
thus scarce and when they are located, the ability to develop and transfer oil to mar-
kets takes several years.
The global economy has become dependent on cheap oil, the United States being
the most powerful example (Greene et al., 2002). Since transportation activities
account for 52% of total oil consumption, motorization is one of the driving forces
behind petroleum consumption. An average 77.5 Mb/d were consumed in 2002,
57% of it in developed nations. While the United States rank as the leading global
consumer of oil (20.1 Mb/d), the rapid growth of the Chinese economy over the
last decade has propelled China to the second rank of oil consumers (5.5 Mb/d),
surpassing Japan (5.3 Mb/d). China accounts for approximately 40% of global
growth in oil demand in recent years. Almost 55% of total oil consumed in the
United States was imported in 2002. This figure is expected to rise to 65% by 2010.
Demand is also subject to some degree of seasonality, with increased use for heating
oil in winter and higher gasoline demand in the summer. Depending on the
economic sector, price elasticity ranges from small to significant. While a growth
in oil prices may adversely impact air transportation, car-dependent commuters
are much more likely to bear the increase. Other industrial sectors are also
significantly affected by oil prices, notably plastics and fertilizers. Higher energy
prices are likely to further stimulate relocation to lower cost locations as
manufacturers try to reduce the costs over which they have some control, such as
labor, real estate and taxes.
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Figure 2 Inter-Regional Petroleum Movements, 1998 (in million tons)
Source: OECD
The international oil trade is correlated with oil prices and transport costs, and
oil flows are often linked to the proximity of suppliers and consumers (figure 2).
Since the 1970s, there has been a shift in the global flows of petroleum, which were
dominated by flows from the Middle East to Western Europe and North America.
There has been an acceleration of the trend that began with the re-industrialization
of Japan after World War II. Development of the “Tigers” – South Korea, Taiwan,
Hong Kong and Singapore – has brought with it growing oil demand in Pacific
Asia and a corresponding shift of oil flows predominantly served by the Middle
East. The growth of China, however, is the single most important factor in the
increase of global oil demand, and raw materials in general, since it squeezes supply
and drives prices upwards.
PETROLEUM TRANSPORTATION
Petroleum transportation is one of the best examples of a derived transport
demand as its circulation is a direct consequence of consumption. This tightly
integrated distribution network involves a continuous flow from the oil fields to
the final consumption, with rather limited storage outside of strategic reserves 6.
The volume of international oil trade increased as a result of world economic growth
and higher energy demand. The largest oil consumers are the most highly-developed
nations, including the United States, Western Europe and Japan, which account
for approximately 75% of global crude oil imports. International oil trade is necessary
to compensate for the spatial imbalances between supply and demand (figure 1).
Unlike most other countries, which either consume almost their entire production
(United States) or have privileged partners (Russia and Western Europe), a major por-
tion of OPEC’s oil is traded on international markets.
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Since the first oil tanker began shipping oil in 1878 in the Caspian Sea, the capacity
of the world’s maritime tanker fleet has grown substantially, to become a specialized
segment of the maritime industry (Ratcliffe, 1985). Each year, approximately 1.9 billion
tons of petroleum are shipped by maritime transportation, which is roughly 62% of
all petroleum produced and 37% of total tonnage and 44% of total tons/km shipped
by maritime transportation. The remaining 38% use pipelines, trains or trucks over
smaller distances. Most of the petroleum follows a set of producing and consuming
shipping lanes (figure 3). Over 100 million tons of oil is shipped each day by tanker,
almost half of which is loaded in the Middle East and shipped to Japan, the United
States and Europe. Tankers bound for Japan use the Strait of Malacca, while tankers
bound for Europe and the United States use either the Suez Canal or the Cape of
Good Hope, depending on the tanker’s size and the destination.
Figure 3 Oil Flows, Major Chokepoints and Oil Transited
 at Major Strategic Locations, 2003
Source: Energy Information Administration (2003)
The world tanker fleet capacity (excluding tankers owned or chartered on a
long-term basis for military use) represented approximately 280 million deadweight
tons in 2002. There are roughly 3500 tankers available on the international oil
transportation market. The cost of hiring a tanker is known as the charter rate. It
varies according to the size and characteristics of the tanker, its origin, destination
and the availability of ships, although larger ships are preferred due to the
economies of scale they offer. Approximately 435 VLCCs 7 account for one-third of
all the oil carried. Tanker ships can also be used as semi-permanent storage tanks.
In 1990, about 5% of the world’s tanker capacity was used for this purpose.
The size of a tanker determines the route it takes, due to distance and port
access constraints. Maritime oil transportation is therefore specialized in terms of
ship size, according to the markets served. VLCCs are used mainly from the Mid-
dle East to cover long distances (Western Europe, United States and Pacific Asia).
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“Suezmax” 8 tankers are used mainly for long to medium hauls between West Africa
and Western Europe and the United States, while “Aframax” 9 tankers are used for
short to medium hauls, such as between Latin America and the United States. Trans-
port costs have a significant impact on market selection. For instance, three-quarters
of United States oil imports originate from the Atlantic Basin (including Western
Africa), with journeys of less than 20 days. Venezuelan oil takes about 8 days to
reach the United States, while Saudi oil takes 6 weeks. The vast majority of Asian
oil imports come from the Middle East, a 3-week journey. Moreover, due to
environmental and security concerns, single-hulled tankers are gradually being
phased out and replaced by double-hulled tankers (Timmons, 2004).
Transportation costs account for a small percentage of the total cost of gasoline
at the pump, about 5 to 10% of the added value of oil.  As United States dependency
on oil imports increases and as new consumers create additional demand, more
pressure will be felt on oil circulation chokepoints.
STRATEGIC PASSAGES:
CHOKEPOINTS OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
Maritime transportation, as the dominant purveyor of international freight dis-
tribution, operates over a global maritime space. This space has its own constraints,
however, such as the profile of continental masses. International shipping lanes
are forced to go through specific locations such as passages, capes and straits. There
are approximately 200 of these locations, but only a handful are of strategic impor-
tance. By definition chokepoints tend to be shallow and narrow, impairing naviga-
tion and their capacity is being challenged by growing maritime circulation and
larger ships (Feller, 2004). Many chokepoints are in close proximity to politically
unstable nations, which increases navigation risks and compromises access and
use. In recent years, the threat of terrorism has raised additional concerns over
maritime circulation (Richardson, 2004). Strategic passages can be mined, blocked
by sinking ships, or interdicted by naval forces, artillery or missile systems.
Chokepoints truly are the geographical Achilles heels of the global economy.
The geostrategy of maritime petroleum circulation involves six major
chokepoints (figure 3), which handle over 35 Mb/d. Their use is shared with regular
flows of commercial maritime shipping, including containers and other cargos.
Two are extremely important: Hormuz and Malacca, since they account for over
60% of oil transits. Hormuz represents the most important strategic passage in the
world, solely because of its access to the oil fields of the Middle East, while Ma-
lacca is an active commercial point of transit between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
From the Persian Gulf, two major axis of oil circulation serve Western Europe and
the United States (westbound) and Pacific Asia (eastbound). As eastbound and
westbound oil shipments grow, so too does the need to maintain the integrity of
the strategic passages that support its trade. This is particularly the case for China,
since its oil imports stretch from the Strait of Hormuz, Malacca and the South China
Sea, most of which are patrolled by the United States.
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Figure 4 Shipping Lanes and Strategic Passages in the Middle East
STRAIT OF HORMUZ
The Strait of Hormuz forms a strategic link between the oil fields of the Persian
Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean (figure 4). It is 48 to 80 km wide, but
navigation is limited to two 3-km-wide channels, each used exclusively for inbound
or outbound traffic. Circulation in and out of the Persian Gulf is therefore extremely
confined, because the sizable number of tankers makes navigation difficult along
the narrow channels. In addition, islands that ensure control of the strait are
contested by Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Security within the strait has often
been compromised. Between 1984 and 1987 there was a “Tanker War” between
Iran and Iraq, during which each party, in their own belligerence (Iran-Iraq War of
1980-1988), began firing on tankers, even neutrals, bound for their respective ports.
Shipping in the Persian Gulf dropped 25%, forcing the intervention of the United
States to help secure oil shipping lanes.
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Approximately 88% of all the petroleum exported from the Persian Gulf tran-
sits through the Strait of Hormuz, bound to Asia, Western Europe and the United
States. Its importance in global oil circulation cannot be overstated. For instance,
75% of all Japanese oil imports transit through the strait. There are thus very few
alternative outlets for oil exports from the Persian Gulf if the traffic, which represents
approximately 14 Mb/d, going through Hormuz was compromised (figure 5).
Moreover, an unannounced closure of the strait would trap roughly 7 to 10% of the
global VLCC fleet in the Persian Gulf.
Figure 5 Oil Exports from the Persian Gulf per Outlet, 2002
The only other significant outlet for Persian Gulf oil is the pipeline to the Saudi
Arabian port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, which can handle approximately 4.8 Mb/d.
The Sumed pipeline, which runs relatively parallel to the Suez Canal is also
indirectly an outlet of the Persian Gulf but would be dependent on the capacity to
ship Middle Eastern oil (mainly Saudi) to the Red Sea either by pipeline (Yanbu) or
through Bab el-Mandeb. The other two pipelines link northern Iraq (Kirkuk region)
to Syria or Turkey (port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean) and do not offer significant
additional capacity.
SUEZ CANAL AND STRAIT OF BAB EL-MANDEB
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 ushered in a new era of European in-
fluence in Pacific Asia. The journey from Asia to Europe was remarkably reduced,
by saving 6500 km from the circum Africa route. The canal has no locks, because
the Mediterranean Sea and Gulf of Suez have roughly the same water level. In
1874, Britain bought the shares to the Suez Canal Company. Under the 1888 agree-
ment, the canal was to remain open to vessels from all nations in time of peace or
war. Great Britain, however, claimed the need to control the area in order to maintain
its maritime power and colonial interests (namely in South Asia). In 1936, it acquired
the right to maintain defense forces along the Suez Canal, which turned out to be
of strategic importance during World War II to uphold Asia-Europe supply routes
for the Allies.
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The second half of the XXth century saw renewed geopolitical instability in the
region with the end of colonialism and the emergence of Middle Eastern nationalism.
In 1954 Egypt and Great Britain signed an agreement that superseded the 1936 treaty
and provided for the gradual withdrawal of all British troops from the Canal Zone.
All British troops were withdrawn by June 1956 as the canal was nationalized by
Egypt. This triggered problems with Israel, as Israeli ships were not permitted to
cross the canal. This threat was also extended to France and Britain, the former owners
of the canal because they refused to help finance the Aswan High Dam project, as
initially promised. Israel, France and Britain thus invaded Egypt in 1956. Egypt
responded by sinking ships in the canal, effectively closing it between 1956 and 1957.
An agreement regarding use of the canal was subsequently reached.
Geopolitical problems persisted, however, as tensions between Israel and Arab
nations increased in the 1960s. The Six Days War between Israel and Egypt and the
invasion of the Sinai Peninsula by Israel caused the Suez Canal to close between
1967 and 1975. This event significantly destabilized international transportation
and favoured the development of ever larger tankers for use along the lengthy
circum Africa route. The canal was re-opened in 1975 and Egypt agreed to allow
Israel to use it. Significant improvements were made between 1976 and 1980, mainly
widening of the canal to accommodate 200 000-ton VLCCs, ensuring the oil trade
between Europe and the Middle East. The minimum width of the channel is
60 metres and ships with up to 16 metres (58 feet) of draft can make the transit.
This means that ULCCs cannot pass through the Canal when fully loaded. A
common practice is to unload parts of Mediterranean-bound ships and use the
Sumed pipeline. Through additional deepening and widening projects, the depth
of the canal is expected to reach 22 metres by 2010.
The canal can accommodate up to 25 000 ships each year, but handles
approximately 14 000, which is 38 ships each day on average, accounting for 14%
of the global trade. Since the canal can handle only unidirectional traffic, crossings
must be organized into convoys of about 10-15 ships. Three convoys each day, two
southbound and one northbound, are organized. Missing a convoy causes additional
delays. Many maritime companies therefore choose to skip a port call to ensure
that their ship arrives on time at the Suez Canal to be part of a specific convoy.
The Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, a strategic link between the Indian Ocean and Red
Sea, controls access to the Suez Canal. The large amount of tanker traffic makes
navigation difficult along the narrow channels. A closure of this strait would have
serious consequences, since it would force a detour around the Cape of Good Hope
and in the process require additional tanker space.
BOSPHORUS
The Passage of Bosphorus is 30 km long and 1 km wide at its narrowest point,
linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea (figure 4). Two conflicts have erupted
over this passage, namely the Crimean War (1854) and the Battle of the Dardanel-
les (1915). The passage was fortified by Turkey after the Convention of Montreux
in 1936, which recognized its control of Bosphorus but granted free passage in
peace time to any commercial vessel without inspection. With the passage of the
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Dardanelles, Bosphorus forms the only link between the Black Sea and
Mediterranean Sea. In light of current world affairs, the Bosphorus represents a
passage of growing strategic importance, notably after the fall of the Soviet Union.
The Caspian Sea has vast oil reserves and a large amount must likely transit through
the Black Sea and Bosphorus to reach outside markets, namely around the
Mediterranean Sea. Although pipelines offer an alternative, the cost differentials
favour use of maritime transportation. For instance, the cost of moving oil along
the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline ranges between US$1 and US$2 per barrel, whereas
shipping oil by tanker through the Black Sea costs 20 cents per barrel (Brito, 1999).
Approximately 50 000 ships, including 5500 tankers, transit through the pas-
sage each year, which is approaching capacity. The physical limits of the strait can
accommodate tankers to a maximum capacity of 200 000 dwt. The amount of oil
transiting through the Bosphorus has growth significantly in recent years, with the
development of oil fields around the Caspian Sea. Approximately 3 Mb/d were
transiting through the passage in 2003. Future growth of petroleum circulation
through Bosphorus is therefore highly problematic, notably the risk of collision
and oil spills in the midst of Istanbul. In response, the Turkish government
prohibited, in 2002, use of the passage during the night by large tankers.
STRAIT OF MALACCA
The Strait of Malacca is one of the most important strategic passages in the world
because it supports the bulk of the maritime trade between Europe and Pacific Asia,
which accounts for 50 000 ships each year (600 per day). The strait is approximately
800 km long and between 50 to 320 km wide (2.5 km at its narrowest point) and has a
minimum channel depth of 23 metres (roughly 70 feet). It is the longest strait in the
world used for international navigation. Close to 30% of the world’s trade and 80% of
petroleum imports to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan transit through the strait, which
represented approximately 11 Mb/d in 2003. As the main passage between the Pacific
and Indian Oceans, Malacca is an unavoidable bottleneck, with the Strait of Sunda
(Indonesia) being the closest alternative (figure 6).
For centuries, the Strait of Malacca has been part of the Arab trade routes linking
the Middle East, Southeast Asia and China. By the early XVIth century the Portuguese
conquered the stronghold of Malacca, a key trading centre after which the strait
bears its name. In 1867, England formally took control of the passage. Singapore
became a main harbour and other important centers, such as Malacca and Penang,
formed the Strait Settlements. This control lasted up to the Second World War and
the independence of Malaysia in 1957. As Pacific trade swelled after the Second
World War, so too did the importance of the passage. Singapore, located at the
southern tip of the Strait of Malacca, is one of the most important ports in the
world and a major oil refining centre. Dredging is one of the main problems of the
Strait of Malacca, since some sections are barely deep enough to accommodate
ships of approximately 300 000 deadweight tons. Because the strait is located
between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, it is difficult to reach an agreement
about how the dredging costs should be shared and how fees for its use should be
levied. Political stability and piracy are also major issues for the safety of maritime
circulation, especially on the Indonesian side.
5-Rodrigue.pmd 10/02/2005, 11:06369
370 Cahiers de Géographie du Québec ◆ Volume 48, n° 135, décembre 2004
Figure 6 Shipping Lanes and Strategic Passages in Pacific Asia
The Strait of Malacca leads to the South China Sea, another extremely impor-
tant shipping lane and a region subject to contention, since oil and natural gas
resources are present. The Spartly 10 and Paracel groups of islands are claimed in
whole or in part by China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines.
The region has proven oil reserves estimated at 7.0 Bb with oil production accounting
for 2.5 Mb/d. Given the substantial economic growth in the region, large flows of
oil, liquefied natural gas and other raw materials (iron ore, coal) are transiting
towards East Asia. About 25% of the global shipping fleet transits through the
region each year, underscoring the importance of the South China Sea as an exten-
sion of the Malacca chokepoint.
PANAMA CANAL
The Panama Canal joins the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans across the Isthmus of
Panama in Central America. Running from Cristobal on Limon Bay, an arm of the
Caribbean Sea, to Balboa, on the Gulf of Panama, the canal is slightly more than
64 km in length. Its operational characteristics involve a minimum depth of 12.5 m
and a minimum width of 91.5 m. Its construction ranks as one of the engineering
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marvels of all time, since it averts a long detour around South America, thus
supporting the maritime flows of world trade. The Panama Canal is strategically
important to the United States because it is a rapid link between the east and west
coast, saving approximately 13 000 km (from 21 000 km to 8000 km). It is comprised
of three main elements, the Gatun Locks (Atlantic Ocean access) the Gaillard Cut
(continental divide) and the Miraflores Locks (Pacific Ocean access).
In its 90 years of existence, over 800 000 vessels have transited the canal, carrying
6 billion tons of cargo. About 13 000 ships transit the canal every year, with an
average of 35 ships each day. The canal, however, has the capacity to handle 50 ships
a day. Grains account for roughly 43% of traffic, while containers and petroleum
products account for 11% and 10% respectively, representing oil traffic of
approximately 0.6 Mb/d. The Panama Canal Authority collects tolls on all ships
that cross the canal. A loaded ship pays about US$2.57 per net ton and the average
toll is about US$45 000. The introduction of super-tankers in the early 1950s forced
a rethinking of its strategic importance since economies of scale in petroleum
shipping are limited by the size of the canal. It is synonymous with a standard in
maritime transport related to capacity, the Panamax standard, which is equivalent
to 65 000 deadweight tons and a draft of 12 metres.
The canal handles close to 12% of the American international seaborne trade of
the United States. Under the control of the United States until 1979, its administra-
tion was entrusted to the State of Panama by the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977. In
December 1999, ownership of the canal was returned to Panama and is managed
by the Panama Canal Authority. The same year, the Hong Kong port operator,
Hutchison-Whampoa, leased terminals on the Atlantic (Cristobal) and Pacific (Bal-
boa) portions of the Canal with a 25-year lease. This raised concerns within the
United States government as it was perceived that control of the canal was falling
into foreign interests, namely to a company perceived to be a façade for the Chinese
government. There is also the issue of improvement to the rail line between the
two ports to handle growing containerized traffic. This rail line is important because
it offers an alternative to the size limitations of the canal, preventing large – “post-
panamax”– containerships to go through. The same rationale applies to oil circula-
tion with the trans-panama pipeline, which resumed operations in 2003. The
additional capacity this pipeline provides, however, is limited to approximately
1 Mb/d. New oil development projects, namely in Ecuador and Peru, are likely to
increase the importance of Panama in global oil distribution.
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CONCLUSION
Growing demand and squeezed supplies are unavoidable consequences of the
geography of petroleum production, distribution and consumption. The global
economy is beginning to realize the full extent of a growing shortage of oil and its
inherent economic and geopolitical costs. Current estimates place the peak of glo-
bal oil production at around 2008-2010 (Deffeyes, 2001; Greene et al., 2003). In the
meantime, oil consumers are struggling to diversify their oil supplies, but most of
the remaining oil reserves are predominantly in the Middle East, a region which
will remain the focal point of global oil shipments. Although there is a current
energy shift towards renewable and environmentally-friendly resources, such as
natural gas and eventually hydrogen, the move from petroleum is likely decades
away (Rifkin, 2002). Even a transition to natural gas, the reserves of which are
substantial, would be very costly since entirely new distribution infrastructures
would be required, including additional LNG carriers, terminals and processing
facilities. Meanwhile, an era of insecurity and vulnerability is likely to prevail as
petroleum circulation increases, with strategic chokepoints bearing the brunt of
the tension. Like the limited additional petroleum production capacity, the circu-
lation capacity, which is mainly dictated by the chokepoints of oil circulation, leaves
little room for additional growth (table 1). These geographical constraints cannot
be bypassed easily and will be a significant factor in global insecurity of oil sup-
plies in terms of who will get preferential access to these limited resources. The
situation is likely to become very tense among large consumers, such as the United
States and China during the second decade of the XXIst century, as they compete,
while the outlets of the Middle East handle the last large volume supply routes of
the petroleum era. Clearly, solutions for petroleum distribution, namely the use of
chokepoints, will require rationalized use, since additional economies of scale in
maritime shipping are difficult to achieve 11 and since alternative routes, including
pipelines are limited and insecure. In spite of all the challenges inherent to oil cir-
culation, “the Spice must flow”.
Table 1 Chokepoints: Capacity, Limitations and Threats
Chokepoint Usage (ships  
/ day, 2003) 
Additional 
Capacity 
Limitation Threat 
Hormuz  50 Limited Narrow corridors Iran / Terrorism 
Suez  38 Some 
200 000 dwt and 
convoy size 
Terrorism 
Bosphorus  135 Very limited 
Ship size  
and length;  
200 000 dwt 
Restrictions by 
Turkey; navigation 
accidents 
Malacca  600 Substantial 300 000 dwt Terrorism / Piracy 
Panama  35 Limited 65 000 dwt Not significant 
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NOTES
1 The amount of energy used per unit of output.
2 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
3 As of 2003, the United States were extracting about 8.8 Mb/d and had an oil reserve of
approximately 72 677 million barrels.
4 Millions of barrels per day (Mb/d). A barrel is the equivalent of 42 US gallons or
159 litres.
5 There have been serious issues regarding the actual availability of oil reserves, since
some figures have been inflated to uphold the confidence of markets and investors.
For instance the oil giant Royal Dutch/Shell acknowledged in 2004 that it had
overestimated its oil and gas reserves by 22% (approximately 4.5 billion barrels).
6 As of 2002, United States strategic reserves were just under 600 million barrels, which
would be enough to supply the United States economy for about a month.
7 Very Large Crude Carriers, which can carry up to 300 000 deadweight tons of crude oil,
about 2 million barrels.
8 Tankers between 120 000 to 200 000 deadweight tons.
9 Tankers between 80 000 and 120 000 deadweight tons.
10 A group of about 230 uninhabitable islands totaling a mere 8 square kilometres.
11 Not necessarily because of ship size, but because of terminal access.
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